The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered by unknown
The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction:
Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered
In any civil suit, a plaintiff may claim several violations of legal
rights. Some of these claims may arise under federal law and thus be
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.' Other claims may arise
solely under state law and thus, absent diversity of citizenship, be
cognizable only in state courts. 2 When a plaintiff advances both state
and federal claims, federal courts may apply the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction,3 which permits the courts to adjudicate state claims related
to a substantial federal claim. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,4 the
Supreme Court broadened the relationship permitted between the
federal and state claims and thus opened the federal courts to numerous
state claims that have no independent basis for federal jurisdiction.5
Since Gibbs was decided in 1966, the Supreme Court has carefully
scrutinized the scope of the doctrine announced in that case only once.0
In A idinger v. Howard7 the Court for the first time confronted the
question of pendent party jurisdiction, which permits federal adjudica-
1. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). Federal subject-matter claims
may arise under other statutory grants. E.g., id. §§ 1333, 1337, 1338.
2. Article III makes a general division of jurisdiction between that based on a federal
question and that based on the citizenship of the parties. The two heads of federal sub-
ject matter jurisdiction are (1) cases arising under federal law and (2) admiralty cases.
The six heads based on the citizenship of the parties are (1) cases affecting ambassadors
and other public ministers; (2) controversies in which the United States is a party; (3)
controversies between two or more states; (4) controversies between citizens of different
states; (5) controversies between a state and citizens of another state; and (6) contro-
versies between a state or its citizens and a foreign state or its citizens. One head refers
both to the citizenship of the parties and to the subject matter of the action: contro-
versies between citizens of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
3. For discussions of pendent jurisdiction, see ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURIS-
DICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1313 (1969); 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567 (1969) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT
& MILLER]; Schulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure,
45 YALE L.J. 393 (1936); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courls,
20 STAN. L. REv. 262 (1968); Note, The Evolution and Scope of Pendent Jurisdiction in
the Federal Courts, 62 CoLuM. L. REv. 1018 (1962); Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. Rrv. 657 (1968); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:
Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1263 (1975).
4. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
5. See note 87 inIra.
6. But cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1973) (dictum) ("[I]t is evident from
Gibbs that pendent state law claims are not always, or even most always, to be dismissed
and not adjudicated. On the contrary, given advantages of economy and convenience
and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs contemplates adjudication of these claims."); note
8 infra.
7. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
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tion of pendent state claims in which the parties are not the same as
the parties to the federal claim.s Pendent party jurisdiction had been
developed in lower federal courts after Gibbs under the principles an-
nounced in that decision.9 The A ldinger Court reaffirmed the broad
test for pendent jurisdiction established in Gibbs, but it attempted to
restrict pendent party jurisdiction.10
This Note argues that the Court's attempt to confine pendent party
jurisdiction while preserving Gibbs was unsuccessful. An examination
of the reasoning in Gibbs and Aldinger in light of the principles of
limited jurisdiction of Article III reveals constitutional inadequacies
in Gibbs. The Note offers a restrictive test for determining when to
permit pendent jurisdiction-a test that comports with the mandate of
Article III.
I. From Gibbs to Aldinger
A. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs
A coal company hired Paul Gibbs as a mine superintendent and gave
him a contract to haul coal from the mine to a railroad terminal. Mem-
bers of a local branch of the defendant union forcibly prevented the
mine from opening. As a result, Gibbs lost his job as superintendent
and could not perform his haulage contract.
Alleging violation of section 303 of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act (LMRA), n which prohibits secondary boycotts, and unlawful
conspiracy to interfere with his employment and haulage contracts,
Gibbs brought suit against the union in federal district court.12 The
trial court accepted jurisdiction over both the federal claim of illegal
8. In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), the Court also considered the
problem of pendent party jurisdiction, but it declined to rule whether the federal courts
have power to hear pendent party claims. Id. at 710-17. The Court instead affirmed
the discretionary dismissal of the pendent party claim. Id. at 715. Cf. Philbrook v.
Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975) (Court will not decide if pendent party jurisdiction extends
to Secretary of HEW where substantive issue could have been decided without him and
Secretary stated he would comply with decision). For discussions of pendent party juris-
diction, see 13 WRIGHT 9- MILLER, supra note 3, at 457-62; Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction-
The Problem of "Pendenting Parties," 34 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1 (1972); Comment, Aldinger
v. Howard and Pendent Party Jurisdiction. 77 COLum. L. REV. 127 (1977); Comment,
Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction-The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring Claims, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 153 (1973); Note, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pendent Party Juris-
diction, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1357 (1977).
9. See pp. 633-36 infra.
10. 427 U.S. at 14.
11. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
12. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 220 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Tenn. 1963), afj'd, 343
F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
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secondary boycott and the state claim of unlawful conspiracy.' 3 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed.14
The Supreme Court took the opportunity on certiorari to redefine
the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. 1 When it had last addressed the
13. 220 F. Supp. at 880-81.
14. Gibbs v. United Mine Workers, 343 F.2d 609 (6th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 383 U.S. 715
(1966).
15. The origin of pendent jurisdiction has been traced to Osborn v. Bank of United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). ALI, supra note 3. at 208; 13 WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 3, at 439. In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall stated:
[Wk]hen a question to which the judicial power of the union is extended by the
Constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress
to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact
or of law may be involved in it.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 823. Since the validity of the Bank's existence and its power to
transact business were at least implicit questions in every case, and since those questions
depended on its charter of incorporation, a federal law, the Court held that the federal
courts could have jurisdiction over all suits involving the Bank. Id.
The language in Osborn could support a very broad federal jurisdiction. Whenever an
entity can trace its existence or its powers to federal law, it may sue and be sued in
federal court. Such jurisdiction was actually upheld in the Pacific Railroad Removal
Cases, 115 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1885). But this broad reading of Osborn was rejected by the
Supreme Court in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379
n.50 (1959), and by Congress in the Judiciary Act of 1925, ch. 229, § 12, 43 Stat. 941
(present version at 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1970)).
Other statements in the Osborn opinion, however, imply a narrower view of federal
jurisdiction. References to the "character of the cause" and the "origin" of the action,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822, 825, indicate that Marshall was using the "source of law" test
that was later used to determine whether a case arises under federal law; that is, a
case arises under federal law if federal law creates the right whose vindication is sought,
see note 70 infra. Although Marshall's unusual application of this test may be disputed,
it may have resulted from an attempt to protect the Bank. See Textile Workers v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 473 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); C. WRIGHT, THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 78-79 (3d ed. 1976).
Siler v. Louisville & N.R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), has also been cited as a significant
development in the evolution of pendent jurisdiction. 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
3, at 440. Siler, however, is consistent with a narrow reading of Osborn. In Siler a
state order regulating railroad freight rates was attacked as unauthorized under state
law and as unconstitutional under federal law. The Supreme Court stated:
The Federal questions, as to the invalidity of the state statute because, as al-
leged, it was in violation of the Federal Constitution, gave the Circuit Court juris-
diction, and, having properly obtained it, that court had the right to decide all
the questions in the case, even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to
the party raising them, or even if it omitted to decide them at all, but decided the
case on local or state questions only.
213 U.S. at 191. The state regulation was held invalid on state grounds; the Court
declared this course preferable to an unnecessary determination of federal constitutional
questions. Id. at 193.
The Sler holding should be regarded as an attempt to refrain from rendering ad-
visory opinions. An actual case or controversy would only have been presented if the
state regulations were actually valid under state law. If the Court had merely assumed
the regulation's validity for the purpose of deciding the constitutional question, it would
have been rendering an advisory opinion. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157
(1961). A decision on the state question was thus necessary to a decision on the Four-
teenth Amendment question; if the regulation were unauthorized under state law, there
would have been no federal question to decide.
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doctrine in Hum v. Oursler,16 the Court had distinguished a non-
federal ground supporting a federal cause of action from a nonfederal
cause of action:
The distinction to be observed is between a case where two dis-
tinct grounds in support of a single cause of action are alleged,
one only of which presents a federal question, and a case where
two separate and distinct causes of action are alleged, one only of
which is federal in character. In the former, where the federal
question averred is not plainly wanting in substance, the federal
court, even though the federal ground be not established, may
nevertheless retain and dispose of the case on the non-federal
ground; in the latter it may not do so upon the non-federal cause
of action.17
In defining cause of action as the violation of a legal right,18 Hum
quoted with approval Baltimore Steamship Co. v. Phillips9 to the effect
that " '[a] cause of action does not consist of facts,' ... 'but of the un-
lawful violation of a right which the facts show.' "20
Calling this test "unnecessarily grudging," the Gibbs Court held that
pendent jurisdiction exists whenever a substantial claim arises under
federal law and the relationship between that claim and the state claim
is such that the two form "one constitutional 'case.' "21 The Court then
defined the scope of an Article III "case":
The state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to their federal
or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding,
then, assuming the substantiality of the federal issues, there is
power in the federal courts to hear the whole.22
16. 289 U.S. 238 (1933). Hurn itself did not use the term "pendent jurisdiction." The
term first appeared in 1946 in Best & Co. v. Miller, 67 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). Prior
to Best, it was known as the Hurn v. Oursier doctrine. E.g., Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139
F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 738 (1944).
17. 289 U.S. at 246 (emphasis in original). In Hurn the petitioners' suit alleged a federal
claim of copyright infringement and two state common law claims of unfair competition.
The Court permitted jurisdiction over the federal claim and one of the state claims be-
cause they constituted one cause of action-the "violation of a single legal right, namely,
the right to protection of a copyrighted play." Id.
18. Id.
19. 274 U.S. 316 (1927).
20. Id. at 321, quoted in 289 U.S. at 246. The Court continued: "'[t]he number and
variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of action so long as
their result, whether they be considered severally or in combination, is the violation
of but one right by a single legal wrong. " 274 U.S. at 321, quoted in 289 U.S. at 246.
Relying on Phillips, the Hurn Court thus focused on rights, not on facts, in determining
jurisdiction.
21. 383 U.S. at 725.
22. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Having redefined the "power" of federal courts to hear pendent claims,
the Court placed a second constraint on the exercise of pendent juris-
diction: application of the doctrine is within the federal court's discre-
tion.2  Specifically, the Court held that even if the state and federal
claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, the federal court
should exercise pendent jurisdiction only if judicial economy, fairness
to the litigants, and comity with state law will be served.2 4
The Court found support for its test in the resolution of the long-
standing debate concerning the definition of "cause of action." The
Court noted that in 1933, when Hurn was decided, the meaning of
cause of action was in dispute. Some viewed cause of action as the
violation of a legal right.2 -5 This was the definition adopted by the
Hurn Court. Others defined cause of action as a factual transaction
out of which any number of legal wrongs might arise.2 6 The Gibbs
Court regarded the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which allow joinder of claims that arise from the same transaction, as
marking the end of the controversy in favor of the transactional def-
inition.27
B. Aldinger v. Howard
Monica Aldinger, a clerical employee, was fired from her job in the
county treasurer's office. The treasurer informed her that although
her performance had been " 'excellent,'" she would be discharged be-
cause she was " 'living with [her] boyfriend.' "28 Claiming violations of
her substantive and procedural constitutional rights, Aldinger brought
suit in federal district court against the treasurer, other county officials,
23. Id. at 726.
24. Id. The Court sought to guide the lower federal courts' exercise of discretion by
discussing a number of jurisdictional possibilities. Thus, if the federal claim were dis-
missed before trial, or if the state claim predominated in terms of proof, remedy sought,
or scope of issues raised, then the state claim should be dismissed. But if the state
claim were closely tied to questions of federal policy, then the argument for pendent
jurisdiction would be particularly strong. If taking jurisdiction over the state claim
would likely cause jury confusion, however, pendent jurisdiction should be denied. Id.
at 726-27.
25. E.g., J. POMEROY, CODE REueEnis § 347 (4th ed. 1904); Gavit, A Pragmatic Defi-
nition of the "Cause of Action"?, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 129 (1933).
26. Judge Charles Clark was the foremost advocate of the transactional view. See
C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 127-47 (2d ed. 1947); Clark, The Cause of Action, 82 U. PA.
L. REV. 354 (1934). The transactional definition made its appearance in the Field Code
of 1848. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVL PROCEDURE 19 (2d ed. 1977). It is currently found
in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61 (Tent. Draft No. 1 1973). The Gibbs
Court adopted the transactional definition when it required a common nucleus of op-
erative fact, 383 U.S. at 725.
27. 383 U.S. at 724 & n.10 (citing, inter alia, FED. R. Civ. P. 18-20).
28. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 3 (1976).
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and the county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3).20
Aldinger also asserted a state claim against the county resting upon
state statutes waiving the county's sovereign immunity and providing
for the county's vicarious liability for the torts of its officials. 30
The district court dismissed the federal claim against the county on
the ground that the county was not a "person" against whom suit may
be brought under section 1983. Since there was no federal basis for
jurisdiction over the county, the court held that it had no power to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claim against the county,
even though a federal claim against the individual county officials
remained.31 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 32
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Aldinger argued that her pendent
party claim against the county satisfied the test for pendent jurisdic-
tion established in Gibbs.33 The Court reviewed the development of
pendent jurisdiction and found Gibbs consistent with Article III. 3 4
But the Court found Gibbs distinguishable on two grounds from the
pendent party claim in Aldinger.3 5 The first difference was that the
addition in A idinger of "a completely new party"-that is, the county30
-"would run counter to the well-established principle that federal
courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts
of limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress." 37 The proposition
that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, however, does
little more than restate the problem. Granting the unmistakable
validity of this maxim, 38 the extent of that jurisdiction remains to be
29. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Section 1343(3) gives the district courts original jurisdiction
over actions
to redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Con-
stitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights
of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.120 (1974).
31. The district court decision is recounted in the opinion of the court of appeals.
Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'c, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
32. 513 F.2d 1257, 1258 (9th Cir. 1975).
33. Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
34. 427 U.S. at 14.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 15.
37. id.
38. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2; Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch.) 303 (1809);
THE FEDERALIsT No. 81 (A. Hamilton) 541, 552 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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delimited. That the Court itself regarded this first difference as super-
fluous is indicated by its refusal later in the opinion to hold all pendent
party jurisdiction impermissible. 39
The second basis for distinguishing Gibbs was that contrary in-
ferences could be drawn from the congressional conferrals of juris-
diction in the two cases. The A ldinger Court observed that in the
jurisdictional statutes applicable to Gibbs, Congress had been silent on
whether jurisdiction would extend to an additional state claim against
the same defendant. The way was supposedly left open for assumption
of jurisdiction over a pendent state claim. In contrast, the Aldinger
Court, citing Monroe v. Pape,40 held that Congress had excluded coun-
ties from the reach of section 1983 and had thus implicitly stated that
counties should not be pendent parties to a section 1983 claim.41 The
Court restricted its holding to pendent party cases in which the
federal claim is brought under sections 1983 and 1343(3)42 and con-
cluded:
Two observations suffice for the disposition of the type of case
before us. If the new party sought to be impleaded is not otherwise
subject to federal jurisdiction, there is a more serious obstacle to
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction than if parties already before
the court are required to litigate a state-law claim. Before it can be
concluded that such jurisdiction exists, the federal court must
satisfy itself not only that Art. III permits it, but that Congress in
the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implica-
tion negated its existence.43
As will be established below,44 the A idinger Court's second attempt to
distinguish Gibbs is also unconvincing.
C. Pendent Party Jurisdiction
A idinger is problematic because pendent party jurisdiction follows
logically from Gibbs. Although Gibbs dealt only with a pendent state
claim in which the parties were the same as those in the federal claim,
the Gibbs test was broader. " The Gibbs analysis of the "power" of
39. 427 U.S. at 18. See id. at 21-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961) (legislative history indicates that municipalities may
not be sued under § 1983).
41. 427 U.S. at 16-17.
42. Id. at 18.
43. Id.
44. See pp. 646-48 infra.
45. Although the Gibbs Court did not overrule Hurn, it clearly disapproved of
Hurn's analysis. 383 U.S. at 725. But Hurn's analysis, when applied to the facts in Gibbs,
would have yielded the same jurisdictional result as that reached in Gibbs. Under existing
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federal courts to entertain pendent state claims 46 looked only to the
factual relationship between the state and federal claims, not to the
identity of the parties to the claims. If the federal and state claims
derived from a common nucleus of operative fact,4 7 then the Gibbs test
would grant the power to hear the state claim, irrespective of the
identity of the parties to the claims. This view is buttressed by the
statement in Gibbs that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"joinder of claims, parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged." 48
Prior to A ldinger the great majority of lower federal courts had held
that the principles in Gibbs permit the exercise of pendent party juris-
diction.49 Thus, in Astor-Honor v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc.,r0 the Second
Circuit upheld the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over a state claim of
unfair competition, even though one of the defendants was not a party
to the jurisdiction-conferring federal claims. Judge Friendly stated that
"[a]lthough the pendent claim in Gibbs did not include a party not
named in the federal claim, Mr. Justice Brennan's language and the
common sense considerations underlying it seem broad enough to cover
that problem also." 51 Similarly, before his elevation to the Supreme
Court, Justice Blackmun affirmed the extension of federal jurisdiction
to a wife's claim for loss of consortium.a The wife's claim was held
precedent, a state claim of unlawful conspiracy to interfere with business relationships
could have been held pendent to a federal claim of illegal secondary boycott. United
Mine Workers v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959) (state and federal
claims are different grounds supporting same cause of action-right to be free from
wrongful interference with business). In the alternative, the Court could have found
that all of the elements of the state claim would have been adjudicated in passing on
the federal claim. Shakman, supra note 3, at 264-65. Under pre-Gibbs case law, federal
courts were authorized to decide state claims when adjudication of the federal claim
would necessarily decide the state claim. Id.
46. 383 U.S. at 725, quoted at p. 630 supra.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 724 (emphasis added).
49. Pendent party jurisdiction has been granted in cases where the plaintiff alleged
against employer trustees state claims of breach of fiduciary duty and alleged against
union trustees federal claims of violation of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act § 501, 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1970), and LMRA §§ 301, 302, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185, 186 (1970),
e.g., Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1975): accord, Connecticut Gen. Life As-
surance Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968) (LMRA claim against employer joined
with breach of contract claim against insurer), where state claims of unfair competition
and federal claims of patent infringement were alleged against various parties who
formed a corporation with allegedly purloined trade secrets, Schulman v. Huck Finn
Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973), and where a state claim of negligent bailment against
a warehouse operator and a federal claim of breach of contract in admiralty against
a carrier were alleged, e.g., Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir.
1971); accord, Princess Cruises Corp. v. Bayley, Martin & Fay, 373 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
50. 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971).
51. Id. at 629.
52. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. 9- Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969).
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pendent to her husband's negligence claim against the same de-
fendants:
Although Gibbs concerned claims possessed by a single plaintiff,
the decision clearly indicates that "there is power in federal courts
to hear the whole." . . . Gibbs goes on to say that pendent juris-
diction is a doctrine of discretion and not of the plaintiff's right.
"Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, con-
venience and fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal
court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state claims, even
though bound to apply state law to them * * '" . . These are
present here.53
Only the Seventh and Ninth Circuits consistently refused to apply
Gibbs to pendent party cases5 4 Significantly, both circuits relied upon
pre-Gibbs decisions as authority for their positions.5.5 Gibbs appears to
provide, therefore, a clear rationale for pendent party jurisdiction.
Prior to Aldinger the lower federal courts had also applied Gibbs
in exercising pendent party jurisdiction where a state claim against a
municipality was joined with a section 1983 claim56 and where an
inference of a congressional intention to exclude a party might have
been drawn. Gibbs had served as the basis for extending pendent
jurisdiction to cases where federal jurisdiction was premised upon
diversity of citizenship rather than a federal question.57 In these cases
53. Id. at 816-17 (citations omitted; quoting United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
715, 725, 726 (1966)).
54. Seventh Circuit: Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974) (joinder of common law tort claims against city with § 1983
claim against police denied); Drennan v. City of Lake Forest, 356 F. Supp. 1277 (N.D.
Ill. 1972) (same). Ninth Circuit: Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), af'd
sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), discussed in note 8 supra;
Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969) (joinder of diversity claim for personal in-
juries and loss of consortium claim by spouse denied). In Patrum v. City of Greensburg,
419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970), the Sixth Circuit declined
to exercise pendent party jurisdiction where a tort claim against the city was joined
with a § 1983 claim against the policeman. The court relied upon the discretionary
criteria of Gibbs and also cited a pre-Gibbs case. Id. at 1302 (citing Wojtas v. City of
Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965)).
55. Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) (citing Wojtas v. City
of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965)); Hymer v. Chai,
407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Kataoka v. May Dep't Stores Co., 115 F.2d 521
(9th Cir. 1940)).
56. E.g., Glover v. City of New York, 401 F. Supp. 632 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (§ 1983 claim
against policeman joined with wrongful death claim against city); Eidschun v. Pierce,
335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Iowa 1971) (§ 1983 claim against policeman joined with assault
and wrongful death claims against city). See Greenway v. Thompson, 368 F. Supp. 387
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (pendent party jurisdiction may attach to tort claim against city when
federal jurisdiction grounded on § 1983, but Georgia does not recognize actions against
municipalities).
57. E.g., F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970);
Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968).
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jurisdiction had been extended over pendent claims, even though the
amount in controversy was less than the statutory minimum"8 or com-
plete diversity was defeated.59 In addition, pendent jurisdiction had
been extended over claims that presented federal questions, but did
not allege a sufficient amount in controversy.60
The A ldinger Court's analysis would require the dismissal of all of
these claims. In each situation, Congress has explicitly or by implica-
tion excluded parties or claims not satisfying certain statutory pre-
requisites.6 1 Yet, by focusing solely on the factual nexus between the
state and federal claims, Gibbs implies that all of these claims should
be pendent and thus within federal jurisdiction.
The apparent tension between Aldinger and Gibbs suggests that
both opinions should be reexamined in light of the fundamental prin-
ciples underlying the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts. It will
be especially important to appraise A idinger's statutory analysis since
that analysis represents the Court's attempt to reconcile Gibbs with
the concept of limited jurisdiction.
II. Gibbs, Aldinger, and Article III
A. Principles of Limited Federal Jurisdiction
The Framers placed two restrictions on federal subject matter juris-
diction. First, the language of Article III expressly limits federal juris-
diction to "Cases . . . arising under" federal law. 62 Second, Article III
58. E.g., Beautytuft Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970); Stone v.
Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
59. E.g., Wittersheim v. General Transp. Servs., 378 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Va. 1974);
Campbell v. Triangle Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1972). But see Seyler v. Steuben
Motors, 462 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1972).
60. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974); Young v. Harder, 361 F. Supp. 64 (D. Kan.
1973). In Hagans the Court stated:
[T]he rationale of Gibbs centers upon considerations of comity and the desirability
of having a reliable and final determination of the state claim by state courts having
more familiarity with the controlling principles and the authority to render a final
judgment. These considerations favoring state adjudication are wholly irrelevant
where the pendent claim is federal but is itself beyond the jurisdiction of the District
Court for failure to satisfy the amount in controversy. In such cases, the federal
court's rendition of federal law will be at least as sure-footed and lasting as any
judgment from the state courts.
415 U.S. at 548 (footnote omitted).
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1970 & West Supp. 1977) ($10,000 minimuni except in
actions against United States or its offices or agencies); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch.) 267 (1806) (complete diversity required). In Fawvor v. Texaco, 546 F.2d 636
(5th Cir. 1977), the court held that Aldinger required dismissal of a claim that would
defeat complete diversity.
62. U.S. CONsr. art. III, § 2.
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structurally limits federal jurisdiction through the use of the con-
cepts "Court" and "judicial Power." 63
1. Law-Tied Jurisdiction: "Cases... arising under" Federal Law
A desire to preserve existing state court jurisdiction guided the
Framers in drafting Article III. Thus, in answer to the charge that the
federal courts would usurp state court jurisdiction, Alexander Hamil-
ton stated:
The principles established in a former paper teach us, that the
States will retain all pre-existing authorities, which may not be
exclusively delegated to the federal head . . . .And under this
impression, I shall lay it down as a rule that the state courts will
retain the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be taken
away in one of the enumerated modes.64
During the ratification debates, defenders of the Constitution similarly
insisted that, absent diversity, Article III did not give the federal
courts power to hear cases previously cognizable in state courts. 65
The limitations on federal judicial power are reflected in the tying
of the jurisdiction of the federal courts to a body of federal law. 6
Federal jurisdiction is tied to federal law through the plaintiff's claim
and the factual allegations of the pleadings that express the claim. 7
63. Id. § 1.
64. THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) 553, 553-54 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
65. At the Virginia Convention George Mason warned that federal jurisdiction would
wipe out existing state jurisdiction because of the interrelationship of three constitutional
provisions: Congress's ability to create inferior federal courts, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1,
the "arising under" clause, id. § 2, cl. 1, and the Supremacy Clause, id. art. VI, cl. 2. 3
J. ELLIOT, DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 521-22 (Washington 1836). Congress could
pass laws on virtually every subject regulated by state law and be assured that federal
law would be upheld because of the Supremacy Clause. Then,. by creating large numbers
of federal courts, federal jurisdiction could usurp state jurisdiction because almost all
cases would arise under these federal laws. John Marshall answered that "controversies
respecting lands claimed under the grants of different states [are] the only controversies
between citizens of the same state which the federal judiciary can take cognizance of,"
id. at 554. A similar exchange occurred at the North Carolina Convention. 4 id. at 136-39,
160-63 (Spencer, making objections similar to Mason's); id. at 139 (Spaight, retorting
that federal and state jurisdiction were kept separate); id. at 163 (MacLaine, asserting
that except for land grant cases, state jurisdiction unimpaired).
66. Like Gibbs, this Note considers only the limitations on federal question juris-
diction, not those on party jurisdiction. See note 2 supra. An argument might be made
that since the federal court is to act as if it were a state court when federal jurisdiction
is grounded on diversity, Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the federal
court should have the jurisdictional powers of a state court. But see pp. 648-50 inflra.
67. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); FED. R. Ctv. P.
8(a); see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & NVECHSLER's THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 835-36 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART
& VECHSLER]; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 26, at 58.
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These allegations assert the violation of legal rights.08 But a group of
operative facts may give rise to more than one violation of legal right, 9
whose source may be in either state or federal law. A federal court has
jurisdiction over a claim only if the right allegedly violated has its
source in federal law70 and Congress has conferred jurisdiction over
that right on the federal courts.71 By tying federal jurisdiction to a
body of federal law and thereby divorcing that jurisdiction from state
68. C. CLARK, supra note 26, at 146-48; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 26, at 75-76.
69. C. CLARK, supra note 26, at 137; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 26, at 553.
70. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2 (judicial power shall extend to all cases "arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under their
Authority'); 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (West Supp. 1977) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest or costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States except that no such sum or value shall be required
in any such action brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer
or employee thereof in his official capacity.") The words "arising under [federal law]"
imply that federal law defines the cases cognizable in federal courts. In other words, the
violation of a federally protected legal right establishes the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.
For judicial constructions of the "arising under" clause that support this "source of
law" interpretation, see International Ass'n of Machinists v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372
U.S. 682, 696 (1963) (suit to enforce award of airline board of adjustment, created by
contract pursuant to Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 184 (1970), arises under
federal law because it has its source in Act); American Well Works Co. v. Lane & Bowler
Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916) (suit for injury to business caused by threat to sue for patent
infringement not in itself suit arising under federal law); The Fair v. Kohler Die Co.,
228 U.S. 22 (1913) (action alleging patent infringement arises under patent laws and
is within federal jurisdiction). This clause has also been interpreted as permitting federal
jurisdiction: (1) if the right to relief depends upon a construction or application of
federal law, Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 201 (1921) (share-
holder action to enjoin directors from placing funds in Federal Land Banks arises under
federal law because suit alleges that Act creating Banks is unconstitutional); Shulthis
v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912) (case does not arise under federal law unless it
substantially involves dispute respecting construction, validity, or effect of such law);
or (2) if federal law is an essential element of the right to relief, Gully v. First Nat'l
Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 115 (1936) (action to collect state taxes from successor of nationally
chartered bank does not arise under federal law because charter is not essential element).
Although this Note's interpretation of "arising under" may be difficult to reconcile
with the other two interpretations, all three views require at minimum that federal law
be crucial to the vindication of the right asserted in the claim. See HART & cVEcHSrER,
supra note 67, at 883-90. Put another way, even if state law is the source of the right
asserted, a case must directly rely upon federal law before it is within federal jurisdiction.
ALI, supra note 3, at 178-79; Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a
Case Arise "Directly" under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 896 (1967); Mishkin,
The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 COLUm. L. REV. 157, 165-66, 168 (1953).
Since federal law may be crucial to some state claims or may be directly relied upon in
those claims, the importance of maintaining the integrity and supremacy of federal law may
justify a departure from a literal devotion to the "source of law" analysis.
71. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869) ("the power to make ex-
ceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words"); Sheldon
v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 444, 449 (1850) ("having the right to prescribe, Congress may
withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated contro-
versies"); see U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, § 2 cls. 1, 2.
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law, this "source of law" examination preserves a system of limited
jurisdiction.7 2
2. Implied Jurisdictional Power: "Judicial Power" and "Courts"
It may be possible to infer jurisdictional power over state claims
from the Framers' use of certain concepts in Article III. Thus the
extension of "judicial Power" to "Courts" may imply that unless the
federal courts have power to hear some state claims, the federal courts
will neither function as "Courts" nor exercise "judicial Power.' '73 This
argument is not new. It is the foundation of the long-recognized and
much-discussed doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. 74 An examination of
ancillary jurisdiction, however, shows that, correctly formulated, it
exhausts the jurisdictional power that may be inferred from the
"Court" and "judicial Power" concepts.
Ancillary jurisdiction originally allowed federal courts to consider
matters not normally within their express jurisdiction in order to give
effect to their jurisdictional mandate.75 Thus, in Freeman v. Howe 8
the federal court had attached the defendant's railroad cars. The
Supreme Court upheld the federal attachment and struck down an
attachment pursuant to a subsequent state court suit by the defendant's
mortgagees. The mortgagees contended that they must be allowed to
prosecute their state suit because they were not of diverse citizenship
72. An analogy is afforded by the system of limited jurisdiction in Australia. The
Australian Constitution confers jurisdiction on the High Court in part as follows:
The Parliament may make laws conferring original jurisdiction on the High Court
in any matter-
(i) Arising under this Constitution, or involving its interpretation:
(ii) Arising under any laws made by Parliament.
AusmL. CONST. § 76. Section 77 of the Australian Constitution authorizes Parliament to
make laws defining the jurisdiction of lower federal courts with respect to matters
delineated in § 76. Section 76 has been construed as follows:
[I]n order to bring a matter within s. 76(ii) . . . the inquiry to be made is not
whether the determination of the matter involves the interpretation of a Federal
law. The relevant inquiry is whether the matter arises under the law. Thus one is
compelled to the conclusion that a matter may properly be said to arise under a
Federal law if the right or duty in question in the matter owes its existence to
Federal law or depends on Federal law for its enforcement, whether or not the de-
termination of the controversy involves the interpretation (or validity) of the law.
The King v. Commonwealth Ct. of Conciliation & Arbitration, 70 C.L.R. 141, 154 (Austl.
1945). The High Court subsequently affirmed this view in Collins v. Charles Marshall
Proprietary Ltd., 92 C.L.R. 529, 540 (Austl. 1955). An Australian claim must assert the
violation of a federal right to come within federal jurisdiction; Australian federal jurisdic-
tion is thus defined by federal law. The drafters of the judicature chapter of the
Australian Constitution were strongly influenced by the American Constitution. Z.
COWEN, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN AUSTRALIA ix-xv (1959).
73. ALI, supra note 3, at 207-08.
74. Id.
75. 13 WRIGHT & MxR, supra note 3, § 3523.
76. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
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and thus could not join the federal court proceeding.77 The Court re-
jected this contention and stated that the mortgagees were entitled to
have their claims heard in the federal suit in order to prevent a con-
flict between the state and federal courts.78
After Freeman, ancillary jurisdiction was allowed over two classes of
matters: proceedings that threatened the judgments, decrees, or pro-
cesses of the federal courts, and proceedings respecting property within
the control of federal courts.79 Ancillary jurisdiction, therefore, was at
first primarily a doctrine that vindicated federal authority. It permitted
extension of federal jurisdiction only to prevent frustration of the ex-
pressly defined jurisdictional powers of federal courts. Judicial economy
and fairness to the litigants were secondary, if salutary, results of the
doctrine.
This original conception of ancillary jurisdiction exhausts the juris-
dictional powers that may be implied by the "Court" and "judicial
Power" concepts. Since a law-tied jurisdictional test is the foundation
for federal subject-matter jurisdiction,"° the only construction of
"Court" and "judicial Power" consistent with this express jurisdictional
scheme is one that would permit those concepts to reach beyond federal
law to the extent necessary to protect law-tied jurisdiction itself.81 Such
77. Id. at 460.
78. Id. at 457-58, 460.
79. Judgments, decrees, and processes: e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble,
255 U.S. 356 (1921) (state court action challenging insurance society reorganization by
nondiverse policyholders enjoined); Cooperative Transit Co. v. West Penn Elec. Co., 132
F.2d 720 (4th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 779 (1943) (claim for property under
after-acqutred property clause in mortgage not within ancillary jurisdiction because
new parties introduced, property not before court in prior action, and issues new). Prop-
erty: e.g., White v. Ewing, 159 U.S. 36 (1895) (receiver may sue on company's notes
despite lack of diversity or insufficient amount in controversy since federal court con-
trols company's assets); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1883) (nondiverse party may
sue when federal court attaches goods in his possession). Shakman, supra note 3, at
270-77, bases his criticism of the reasoning in Gibbs largely on these limitations on
ancillary jurisdiction.
80. See pp. 637-39 supra.
81. By its very nature, an argument for implied powers seeks powers necessary to
protect or effect expressly defined powers. The Supreme Court recognized this limitation
as early as 1812 in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, when it rejected the notion
that the federal courts possess a common law criminal jurisdiction:
When a Court is created, and its operations confined to certain specific objects,
with what propriety can it assume to itself a jurisdiction much more extended?
Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of Justice from
the nature of their institution. But jurisdiction of crimes against the state is not
among those powers. To fine for contempt-imprison for contumacy-inforce the
observance of order,-&C. are powers which cannot be dispensed within a court, be-
cause they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far, our Courts no doubt
possess powers not immediately derived from statute; but all exercise of criminal
jurisdiction in common law cases we are of the opinion is not within their implied
powers.
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 33-34 (1812).
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an exercise of jurisdiction would be available only to protect the judg-
ments and processes of the federal courts and property in their con-
trol; the exercise would thus be identical to the original conception of
ancillary jurisdiction.
B. Application to Gibbs and Aldinger
In light of the jurisdictional scheme established by Article III,
Gibbs provides for an unconstitutionally over-expansive test for pen-
dent jurisdiction. The principal failures of the Gibbs test are, first, that
it is fact-tied rather than law-tied and, second, that it ignores Con-
gress's primary power to control federal jurisdiction. Moreover, the
Gibbs doctrine cannot be saved from these objections by arguing that
ancillary jurisdiction supports pendent jurisdiction. Finally, the his-
torical evidence tends to show that the Court's construction of "case"
itself is incorrect.
In the "power" step of its analysis, 2 Gibbs focused solely on the
facts alleged in the claim. 3 If there is a common nucleus of operative
fact, the federal courts have the power to exercise jurisdiction. 4 The
Framers, however, provided for a law-tied system of jurisdiction that
excluded state claims from the federal courts, absent diversity of
citizenship1s Since a group of operative facts may give rise to several
violations of legal rights,8 6 a fact-tied jurisdictional test may permit
federal courts to adjudicate legal rights whose origins are outside
federal law.8 7 The fact-tied Gibbs test thus permits federal intrusion
82. See p. 630 supra.
83. This Note addresses only the constitutionality of the "power" step in Gibbs. The
Gibbs Court intended that its test mark the constitutional boundaries of jurisdictional
power, but permitted the district courts to abjure the exercise of jurisdiction for discre-
tionary reasons. 383 U.S. at 726. It is appropriate to limit this analysis to the "power"
step. If the "power" step is valid, exercise of discretion will remain within constitutional
boundaries. If the "power" step is overly expansive, however, observance of the jurisdic-
tional limits of Article III would then depend upon the discretion of federal trial judges.
This undesirable result can be avoided by a clear formulation of criteria to guide the
exercise of jurisdictional power. See pp. 648-50 infra.
84. 383 U.S. at 725.
85. See pp. 637-39 & notes 64-72 supra.
86. See note 69 supra.
87. E.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 493 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1022
(1974) (action to force state to issue previously approved drilling permits where oil com-
pany alleged Fourteenth Amendment taking claim and unjust enrichment theory);
McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973) (action against broker for dis-
obeying purchase instructions where federal claim of willful misrepresentation under
Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1970), dismissed, but recovery on state law
of agency permitted); Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420, 426-27 (3d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 913 (1973) (state claims of fraudulent conversion of plain-
tiff's money, tortious interference with plaintiff's advantageous business relations, and
violations of Pennsylvania Milk Control Act held pendent to federal claims of violations
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into state law in contravention of the Framers' jurisdictional scheme.
By basing its conception of pendent jurisdiction on the term "case"
in Article III, the Gibbs Court also failed to recognize the requirement
of a congressional conferral of jurisdiction. 8 Such recognition would
be unnecessary only if "case" in Article III and the conferrals of juris-
diction in section 1331 and other jurisdictional statutes are regarded
as coextensive.8 9 And if the Court did equate the scope of "case" and
congressional conferrals of jurisdiction, it ignored precedent to the
contrary: section 1331 and other jurisdictional statutes do not exhaust
the limits of federal jurisdiction established by Article 111.90 Further,
in construing section 1331, which most closely approximates the lan-
guage of Article III, the courts have used the "source of law" analysis
discussed above, not a test based upon fact-relatedness. 91
The federal courts' implied jurisdictional power, or ancillary juris-
diction, cannot justify the broad pendent jurisdiction declared in
Gibbs.92 Ancillary jurisdiction, in its original and most precise sense,
meant something quite different from pendent jurisdiction: it ex-
of Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970)). Shakman, supra note 3, at 265, also
noted the potential intrusiveness of Gibbs. His reasons for criticizing this intrusiveness
-encouraging the development of state court expertise in deciding federal questions, id.
at. 266, and the likelihood that federal courts will err as much as state courts in de-
ciding nonjurisdictional claims, id. at 267-78-seem highly speculative. In addition,
Shakman failed to recognize the distinction between a law-tied and fact-tied jurisdic-
tional test and the importance of the distinction to pendent jurisdiction.
88. See p. 638 supra.
89. The Gibbs test for pendent jurisdiction was stated in the context of a general
statement on the history and scope of the doctrine. 383 U.S. at 721-27. The opinion
thus goes beyond the particular jurisdictional situation before it. See also note 45 supra.
The actual jurisdictional statute before the court, however, was clearly a law-tied grant.
LMR.A § 303(b), 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970), states that "[w]hoever shall be injured in his
business or property by reason or [sic] any [unfair labor practice] may sue therefor in
any district court of the United States .... " "Unfair labor practice" is defined in 29
U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). In reaching its decision, the Court ignored the congressional con-
ferral of jurisdiction that was present in Gibbs and only discussed the constitutional
parameters of "case." The Court's failure to recognize the need for a congressional con-
ferral of jurisdiction is justified only if it regarded "case" and the suits authorized by 29
U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970) as coextensive. But even if the Court were tracking the Article III
"case" with the suits authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970), that statutory provision, like
§ 1331, provides for jurisdiction over actions to vindicate rights whose source is in federal
law. Hence the Court's fact-tied conception of case is inconsistent with Congress's juris-
diction-conferring statute in Gibbs, 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (1970).
90. Article III and § 1331 seem textually coextensive. The sparse legislative history
indicates that the statutory grant was intended to exhaust the Constitutional grant of
jurisdiction. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 871. Yet § 1331 has not been regarded
as synonymous with Article Ill. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 64-66 (1976).
First, the requirement in § 1331 that a minimum amount in controversy be satisfied
is not found in Article III. Second, federal jurisdiction may be defeated under § 1331,
but not under Article III, if a federal question arises only by way of defense. Compare
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) with Louisville & N.R.R.
v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908).
91. See note 70 supra.
92. ALI, supra note 3, at 207-08.
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panded express federal jurisdiction when it was necessary to protect
the federal courts' jurisdictional mandate. 93 Since Gibbs justifies ex-
ercise of pendent jurisdiction on grounds other than necessity-judicial
economy and fairness to the litigants-ancillary jurisdiction provides
no support for the broad test in Gibbs.94 In the last fifty years, ancillary
jurisdiction has departed from this original conception. Its policies
and the test for its application have blurred with those of pendent
jurisdiction so that ancillary jurisdiction, in this more contemporary
and less precise sense, has become virtually synonymous with broad
pendent jurisdiction. 3 To the extent that ancillary and pendent juris-
diction are now coextensive, any attempt to justify the latter by
reference to the former is circular.
In addition, it is not clear that the Gibbs Court's interpretation of
"case" in Article III is within constitutional boundaries. 90 The Gibbs
opinion omitted virtually any discussion of the Framers' intent in
using "case" in Article II. 9 Although the historical evidence is limited
93. See pp. 639-41 supra.
94. Just as the state claim actually before the Court in Gibbs might have been held
pendent under existing case law, see note 45 infra, adjudication of the state claim may
have also been permitted under the "necessity" conception of ancillary jurisdiction. The
existence of the state claim raised the possibility of inconsistent verdicts and a conflict
between state and federal courts.
95. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609 (1926) (federal court has
ancillary jurisdiction to hear nonfederal counterclaim because it arises out of same
factual transaction as federal claim); United States v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 472 F.2d
792, 794 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 982 (1973) ("Ancillary jurisdiction promotes
the economical and expeditious administration of justice by avoiding a multiplicity of
suits through permitting issues and claims arising out of the same operative facts to be
embraced in a single action."); Comment, supra note 3, at 1265-71.
Although there is a substantial conflict in the case law on the scope of ancillary juris-
diction, 13 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 3523, at 66, a consensus probably permits
its exercise over compulsory counterclaims, cross-claims, impleader of third-party defen-
dants, interpleader, and intervention as of right. Permissive counterclaims and permis-
sive intervention are generally not permitted. Id. at 66-70. Under the Freeman view,
see pp. 639-40 supra, ancillary jurisdiction would probably only extend to impleader,
interpleader, and intervention as of right, and then only to the extent that jurisdiction
is necessary to vindicate federal authority. The other situations in which ancillary juris-
diction has been exercised should be tested according to the standard proposed at pp. 648-
50 infra. The relationship between ancillary and exclusive jurisdiction is discussed further
in note 115 infra.
96. Constitutional terms may be construed by examining their meaning during the
period in which the Constitution was framed. See Hurst, The Process of Constitutional
Construction, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 57 (E. Cahn ed. 1954) ("jury" and
"legislature"). Alternatively, these terms may be taken as general guides that later
generations define according to their own values. See id. at 61 (remarks by Professor
Freund in panel discussion) ("due process'). As the discussion in notes 98 and 99 infra
indicates, it is possible to lend some meaning to "case" through the first mode of analysis.
97. The Court did refer to Article III when it noted that "[t]he question whether
joined state and federal claims constitute one 'case' for jurisdictional purposes is to be
distinguished from the often equally difficult inquiry whether any 'case' at all is pre-
sented." 383 U.S. at 725 n.25. But this statement is irrelevant to the scope of "case" in
Article III.
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and often ambiguous, there are a number of indications that the term
refers to the traditional judicial business of the English courts. 8 An
examination of the meaning of "case" at the time the Constitution was
adopted tends to show that "case" was defined in terms of the right
asserted, not in terms of a factual unit.99
98. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413-14 (1792). In Hayburn's Case, At-
torney General Edmund Randolph sought a writ of mandamus ex officio to compel a
circuit court to proceed upon a veteran's petition for a pension. His motion was denied.
Randolph's failure to satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III by
showing sufficient adversity of legal interests led him to inquire of the Court the practice
it would follow. The Court responded that "[t]he Court considers the practice of the
courts of King's Bench and Chancery in England, as affording the outlines for the
practice of this court; and that they will, from time to time, make such alterations
therein, as circumstances may render necessary." Id. at 413-14. The Court's statement is
not without ambiguity. The most reasonable interpretation is that the Court accepted
common law practice as an outline, but that it reserved the right to alter the details
within this outline. The Court's statement may also mean that it wanted the flexibility
to alter completely the procedural content of "case." Five Framers-William Paterson,
James Wilson, John Rutledge, John Blair, and Oliver Ellsworth-were present on the
Court at the time.
Subsequent judicial constructions of "case" have also looked to the traditional judicial
business of the English courts at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 150 (1951) (standing); Musk-
rat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 355 (1910) (advisory opinions); California v. Southern
Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1895) (indispensability of parties).
Only one attempt at definition of "case" occurred during the Constitutional Con-
vention. As the jurisdictional clauses of Article III were being clarified, it was moved
that jurisdiction be extended to cases arising under the Constitution as well as the
laws of the United States. Madison asked whether jurisdiction should be limited to cases
of a "Judiciary Nature." But the motion was adopted, "it being generally supposed that
the jurisdiction given was constructively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature." 2 M.
FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (1911). In light of this
exchange, Madison's later statements may thus show that "case" is to be defined according
to the usages of the English common law at the time the Constitution was adopted. 9
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 198 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (in 1824 letter, noting that
limited nature of federal government precludes incorporation of common law into Con-
stitution, but agreeing that Constitution "borrows from the common law terms which
must be explained by [common law] authorities").
99. Chief Justice Marshall stated in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821),
that Article III "does not extend the judicial power to every violation of the constitution
which may possibly take place, but to 'a case in law or equity,' in which a right, under
such law, is asserted in a Court of justice." Id. at 405. Later in the same opinion the
Chief Justice again asked:
What is a suit? We understand it to be the prosecution, or pursuit, of some claim,
demand, or request. In law language, it is the prosecution of some demand in a
Court of justice. The remedy for every species of wrong is, says Judge Blackstone,
"the being put in possession of that right whereof the party injured is deprived."
"The instruments whereby this remedy is obtained, are a diversity of suits and ac-
tions, which are defined by the Mirror to be 'the lawful demand of one's right.'["]
* ' * Blackstone then proceeds to describe every species of remedy by suit; and they
are all cases [where] the party suing claims to obtain something to which he has a
right.
Id. at 407-08 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *116). Authors of legal dictionaries
of the eighteenth century also regarded suits-forms of action and bills in equity-as the
means of vindicating a right. 1 CUNNINGHAM'S LAw DICTIONARY (1764) ("action"; "bill");
JACOB'S LAW DiarONARY (1773) ("action"; "bill"). An early nineteenth century treatise
writer agreed. 1 J. CHrrTY, PLEADING 84-87 (New York 1809). These authorities regarded
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The Gibbs Court. thus did little more than assume the conclusion in
declaring a fact-based standard of pendent jurisdiction. The only
authority the Court cited for its constitutional interpretation was the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which allow joinder of claims arising
from the same factual transaction. 0 0 The Rules also state, however,
that they should not be construed as extending federal jurisdiction.' 0 '
In a footnote, the Court dismissed this qualification as a "common-
place," asserted that the Rules "embody the whole tendency of our
decisions," and cited for that proposition Baltimore Steamship Co. v.
"case" as the action of trespass on the case. But "case" could not be indiscriminately
joined with actions arising from the same facts. Different counts could be joined in the
same action if they were of the same "nature," id. at 195-97, or were variations of the
same species of wrong, TDD'S PRAcrICE 10-11 (9th ed. 1828).
Although these authorities defined the bill in equity in terms of a right, the scope of
equity proceedings might have been broader. The drafters of the Field Code, New York,
First Report of the Commissioners, § 120(2) (1848), out of which the transactional defi-
nition grew, looked to the traditional discretion and flexibility of the chancellor for
their model. F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 26, at 12-15, 66. In practice, equity al-
lowed the decision of issues at law and the liberal joinder of claims, subject to a vaguely
defined objection against multifarious suits. id. at 457.
The expansion of equity was opposed by the Framers, because equity was believed to
represent the royal prerogative. For this reason and others, there was a strong anti-
chancellor movement in colonial America. L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW
47-51, 130-31 (1973); Waterman, Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone's Commentaries, in
EssAys IN THI HISToRY OF EARLY A.ERICAN LAW 451, 469-70 (D. Flaherty ed. 1969). Read-
ing the reference to equity in Article III as permitting a broad definition of "case" is,
therefore, an uncertain enterprise.
That the Framers shared an understanding of "case" as the procedural vehicle for
adjudicating an alleged violation of a legal right is also indicated by the statements
made during the Ratification Debates. See p. 637 & note 65 supra. The Framers' in-
sistence that existing state jurisdiction would be preserved is inconsistent with a trans-
actional definition of "case." A transactional definition would allow adjudication of
claims falling solely under state court jurisdiction by the federal courts by virtue of
the factual connection of those claims to the federal claim. Moreover, since opponents of
the Constitution attacked its supposed failure to restrain federal power, J. MAIN, THE
ANrriFRDmEaLisTs 120 (1961), any interpretation of "case" that would have permitted the
federal judiciary wide jurisdictional powers would doubtless have drawn sharp criticism.
Yet, the records of the ratification debates are barren of such criticism.
The narrowing of language used to describe federal jurisdiction in the Constitutional
Convention also points to this conclusion. In the first draft of the Committee of Detail,
jurisdiction was extended to "all cases of national revenue, impeachment of national
officers, and questions which involve the national peace or harmony." 1 M. FARRAND,
supra note 98, at 238. This language would have allowed room for a transactional defi-
nition since a state claim growing out of the same factual transaction with a federal
claim might be said to "involve" the national peace or harmony. Further, the language
refers to questions rather than cases. The description of jurisdiction, however, was later
rephrased to its present form.
Probably the most compelling reason for regarding "case" as the violation of a legal
right is that the Framers would have been aware only of that definition. The transac-
tional definition did not make its appearance until the Field Code of 1848. C. CLARK,
supra note 26, at 22; F. JAMEs & G. HAZARD, supra note 26, at 19.
100. 383 U.S. at 724 & n.10 (citing, inter alia, FED. R. Civ. P. 18-20).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
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Phillips,10 2 a case that advanced the definition of the cause of action
that the Gibbs Court explicitly rejected. 0 3
In constrast, the propositions that the Aldinger Court urged as sup-
port for restricting pendent party jurisdiction have general validity.
The federal courts are indeed courts of limited jurisdiction. 04 And
the scope of pendent jurisdiction should be determined by examining
the "scope of the cause of action as to which federal judicial power has
been extended by Congress."'' 0 But the A ldinger opinion failed to
discern the full implications of its statutory analysis. Once these im-
plications are realized, Aldinger is inconsistent with Gibbs.
Justice Brennan's dissent in A ldinger suggests the implications of
the Court's reasoning. He attacked the notion that pendent party juris-
diction should be denied if Congress by implication has refused to
allow subject-matter jurisdiction over a party:
At one level of analysis, this test is of course meaningless, being
capable of application to all cases, because all instances of asserted
pendent-party jurisdiction will by definition involve a party as to
whom Congress has impliedly "addressed itself" by not expressly
conferring subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. 00
Justice Brennan was concerned that the majority's test meant that
congressional silence would suffice to imply disapproval of pendent
party jurisdiction; all pendent party jurisdiction would thus be
negated. The Justice observed, therefore, that the Court's test would
have to require something more than mere silence as an expression of
congressional disapproval. He then went on to examine the legislative
history of sections 1983 and 1343(3) and concluded that Congress had
not necessarily negated pendent jurisdiction over the state claim in
Aldinger 0 7
Yet a distinction between congressional silence and explicit or im-
plicit congressional disapproval is itself meaningless. Congressional
silence may have a variety of meanings. It may mean that Congress
has not considered whether jurisdiction should be extended over a
matter or party and thus has no opinion on the subject. It should be
102. 383 U.S. at 725 n.13 (citing Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316 (1927)).
In also criticizing the threadbare support that the Court relied upon, Shakman, supra
note 3, at 268-70, neglected to discuss the effect of FED. R. Civ. P. 82 in undercutting
the Court's rationale.
103. 274 U.S. at 321.
,104. See note 38 supra.
105. 427 U.S. at 17 (emphasis in original); see pp. 637-38 supra.
106. 427 U.S. at 23 (emphasis in original).
107. Id. at 23-30.
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remembered in this regard that Congress has yet to grant the full
constitutional measure of jurisdiction. 08 Congressional silence may
also mean that Congress believes that it has already passed statutes con-
ferring jurisdiction over the matter or party.'0 9 Finally, congressional
silence may mean that extension of jurisdiction is so disfavored in
Congress that the question has never been seriously raised. 01 Con-
gressional silence, therefore, is ambiguous; it cannot be interpreted
until there is some subsequent congressional action dealing with the
subject.
Moreover, under the principles of limited jurisdiction, Article III
conditions the exercise of federal jurisdiction on the existence or
passage of some federal law and a congressional conferral of jurisdic-
tion over that law."' Ambiguous congressional silence respecting a
matter or party is thus as fatal to the exercise of federal jurisdiction
as some form of "active" congressional disapproval." 2 The untenability
of the distinction between "active" congressional disapproval and
"passive" congressional silence follows from the "source of law" anal-
108. See note 90 supra.
109. An example might be found in Congress's continuing refusal expressly to confer
jurisdiction over municipalities under § 1983. Congress may believe that § 1331 already
permits suits to be brought against municipalities for civil rights violations through
direct reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment. The Aldinger Court noted the argument
for such suits but did not reach that question. 427 U.S. at 4 n.3.
110. The Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), offer a possible example.
The Supreme Court's decision that the railroads' federal charter of incorporation was
sufficient for jurisdiction under the predecessor of § 1331, The Judiciary Act of 1875, ch.
137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, widened the general federal question jurisdiction granted by Con-
gress. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 69 (1927). Heed-
ing the pleas of a contrite Court, id. at 272-74, Congress prohibited such a basis for federal
jurisdiction with respect to railroads, Act of Jan. 28, 1915, ch. 22, § 5, 38 Stat. 804, and
later with respect to all corporations, Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, § 12, 43 Stat. 941
(present version at 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (1970)).
111. See p. 638 supra.
112. Justice Brennan's dissent indicates the difficulties inherent in discerning implicit
congressional approval or disapproval of the exercise of federal jurisdiction. The legis-
lative history of § 1983 does not clearly support the majority's findings of an explicit
or implied rejection of jurisdiction over municipalities. 427 U.S. at 23-30. Congress may
well have approved of federal jurisdiction over state-created actions against municipalities
under the diversity head. Id. at 25. The jurisdiction that Congress rejected was cog-
nizance of federally created actions against municipalities. Id. at 24-25. In addition, it
makes little sense to speak of congressional intent of any sort to exclude municipalities
from being pendent parties since pendent jurisdiction was unheard of until Hum v.
Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
Reiser v. District of Columbia, No. 76-1411 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1977), is an example
of the judicial confusion that results from the Aldinger standard. In Reiser a claim
against the District of Columbia was joined with a diversity claim against an individual.
Although the court acknowledged that states are not citizens of themselves and thus
cannot be sued under § 1332, and that § 1332 seems to regard the District as a "state," it
upheld pendent party jurisdiction in the face of Aldinger, remarking that "the very ex-
istence of pendent jurisdiction depends upon the conclusion that the federal court has
no direct jurisdiction over the case." Id. at 19.
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ysis and the constitutional allocation to Congress of the power to con-
trol federal jurisdiction.113 The conclusion that Justice Brennan feared
is thus correct: all pendent party jurisdiction is improper under
A ldinger.
The statutory analysis of A ldinger may be taken to its logical con-
clusion by noting that every purely state law claim involves by defini-
tion substantive law that Congress cannot enact or has failed to enact.
Since Aldinger requires the federal courts to determine the reach of
their jurisdiction by construing the scope of the cause of action to
which the judicial power has been extended by Congress, Congress's
failure to create the state-defined cause of action should negate juris-
diction over the state claim. The Gibbs version of pendent jurisdic-
tion thus would be completely destroyed.
The A ldinger Court undertook an analysis fundamentally different
from that of the Gibbs Court. The Gibbs Court looked only to the
supposed scope of "case" in Article III in determining the extent of
pendent jurisdiction. Understandably nervous at the prospect of cir-
cumventing what is regarded as a congressional intention to exclude
a party from federal jurisdiction, the Aldinger Court has rediscovered
the necessity of congressional action to the establishment of federal
jurisdiction.
III. Constitutional Pendent Jurisdiction
A constitutional test for pendent jurisdiction would require the
federal court to examine the rights asserted in the plaintiff's claims.
Under this test, the federal court may take jurisdiction over claims that
assert both state and federal rights, but only if the state and federal
rights are substantially identical." 4 Rather than require a common
nucleus of operative fact, the federal courts would require a "common
nucleus of operative law." 11 In comparing the state and federal rights,
113. See p. 638 supra.
114. Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), see pp. 629-30 supra, was therefore correct
in focusing upon rights rather than facts. The case may have failed as a standard for
pendent jurisdiction because of its lack of clarity in drawing the distinction between a
"ground" and a "cause of action." 289 U.S. at 246. Additionally, in stating that "the
claims of infringement and unfair competition so precisely rest upon identical facts as
to be little more than the equivalent of different epithets to characterize the same group
of circumstances," id., the Court seemed to emphasize the close factual relationship of
the claims. See Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315,
325 (1938). Nevertheless, the Hurn Court later quoted Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274
U.S. 316 (1927), to the effect that " '[a] cause of action does not consist of facts, but of
the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show.'" 289 U.S. at 246 (quoting 274
U.S. at 321). The debate over the meaning of "cause of action," see p. 631 supra, may
have contributed to the confusion.
115. The Court in Gibbs justified broad pendent jurisdiction partly on the basis of
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the federal court would employ the familiar tools of the judicial pro-
cess-logic, precedent, statutory history, and adaptation of existing
rules of law to changing mores and social patterns. Congressionally
"considerations of judicial economy." 383 U.S. at 726. The validity of the judicial economy
argument depends in large part upon the system in which the supposed economies will
occur. From the point of view of the federal system, broad pendent jurisdiction cannot
result in judicial economy since state matters not otherwise cognizable will be adju-
dicated. Restrictive pendent jurisdiction actually better furthers the goal of judicial econ-
omy in the federal courts. If the federal and state courts are viewed as part of a unitary
system, then broad pendent jurisdiction may result in judicial economy because litigants
may bring all their claims in one forum-the federal court. But restrictive pendent juris-
diction also permits this result since litigants can generally bring both federal and state
claims in one forum-the state court. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
507-08 (1962); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 134 (1876) (decided under Bankruptcy
Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, providing for concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
in certain cases).
It may then be objected that this will deprive the federal courts of the initial oppor-
tunity to construe federal law. If, however, there is some paramount federal interest in
an initial construction of some federal law, then Congress can vest the federal courts
with exclusive jurisdiction over that law. Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); The
Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1867). And the possibility of Supreme Court review
of a misconstruction of federal law is always open. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 489, 517 (1928). But see 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 98,
at 124-25; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 67, at 11 (Madison argued that federal trial courts
with original jurisdiction would be necessary to uphold federal rights).
If the federal courts' jurisdiction over the federal claim is exclusive, restrictive pendent
jurisdiction may cause plaintiffs the hardship of choosing between their federal and
state claims, Note, The Impact of Aldinger v. Howard on Pendent Party Jurisdiction,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 1357, 1363-65 (1977). But this hardship is mitigated by the doctrine
of collateral estoppel. Litigation of one of the claims would resolve many factual issues
pertinent to the other claim as a matter of collateral estoppel. State of Maryland ex rel.
Gliedman v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967); D. LOuISELL & G.
HAZARD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 672-76 (3d ed. 1973). State courts
also give preclusive effect to the judgments and matters adjudicated in federal courts. See
Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 86 YALE L.J. 741, 755-56 (1976). With these issues
resolved, settlement of the other claim would seem likely.
Should the hardship created by the exclusivity of the federal claim demand a widened
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction? No principled reason appears for expanding ancillary
jurisdiction beyond the "necessity" conception outlined at pp. 639-40 supra. Exclusivity
of jurisdiction is equivalent to the situation where a plaintiff insists upon bringing his
action in federal court and the defendant or some third party has a claim that cannot
normally be heard in federal court. In that situation, federal jurisdiction will be ex-
panded, but only to the extent necessary to protect the integrity of the federal courts'
processes and ability to dispose of property in their control. See p. 640 supra. Gen-
eral notions of fairness and economy must be distinguished from the principles inhering
in Article III.
Shakman, supra note 3, at 266-68, 285, arrives at many of the same conclusions with
respect to the judicial economy question. His reasons, however, are again very specula-
tive. Id. at 267-68. He also believes that Congress has the power to confer broad pendent
jurisdiction over purely state claims. Id. at 267, 284. This power is discussed and rejected
in note 132 infra. Finally, he regards convenience as a "test" for pendent jurisdiction.
Shakman, supra note 3, at 283. Convenience is not a test, but a consideration that must
be weighed in arriving at a test for pendent jurisdiction. The test proposed in this Note
should minimize potential inconvenience. Nevertheless, even if some inconvenience results,
the final ans~ver to objections based upon concern for judicial economy is that these
considerations do not justify violating the constitutional requirement of limited juris-
diction.
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imposed jurisdictional and procedural limitations would be honored.116
These include restrictions on the minimum amount in controversy
and on the parties who may assert the right in the claims.1 17
Two examples illustrate the application of this test: first, claims are
stated arising under the Constitution and state common law, and
second, under a federal statute and a state statute.
Federal Constitution/state common law. A tenured professor at a
state university is fired because he presented Marxist views to his
classes. His contract provides that he may be fired only if he becomes
physically unable to teach or is convicted of a crime. He brings suit in
federal district court alleging violation of his contract and his right to
free speech. The federal claim arises under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."" The elements of the claim are state interference with
speech, subject to a countervailing governmental interest." 9 The state
claim is based on the common law. The elements of breach of contract
are a valid contract, due performance by plaintiff, and breach by the
defendant. 2 0
Federal jurisdiction should not extend to the state claim. The
federal claim alleges the violation of a fundamental political right
rooted in the Constitution. 21 The state claim alleges the violation of
a separate right rooted in the recognition that the law gives to a
transaction between parties.122 The elements of the two claims assist
the court in characterizing the rights and in determining the overlap
between them. As shown by the complete difference between the
elements of the two claims, the rights here do not overlap at all.
116. Even when sitting as a "state" court in diversity, the federal courts adhere to
federal jurisdictional and procedural limitations. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965);
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
117. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961) (question whether municipal
corporations suable under § 1983 to be answered by legislative history); see note 61
supra. It may be argued that, purely as a matter of statutory construction, the $10,000
minimum should be deemed to be satisfied if there is at least one claim that exceeds
$10,000. The minimum amount in controversy is designed to insure that claims brought
to the federal courts meet a threshold of substantiality, and when one claim meets this
threshold, other pendent claims not meeting it should still be allowed since the attention
of the federal court has been gained by the substantial claim. But see Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (refusing to aggregate claims in diversity class action
on pendent party theory without discussing pendent party jurisdiction). Under this
Note's analysis, the state claim would also have to meet the statutory minimum. But
since under this analysis the state and federal claims would be so closely related, it is
difficult to imagine a case in which the state claim would not meet the statutory minimum.
118. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-10 (1967) (right of
association).
119. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961).
120. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 26, at 112.
121. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (dictum).
122. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 4-6 (1952).
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If, however, the professor's contract contained a term guaranteeing
him "academic freedom," and a state court had construed this term as
incorporating the right to free speech, then a breach of contract action
would be within the pendent jurisdiction of the federal court. But
jurisdiction over this contractual claim would not necessarily confer
jurisdiction over other claims that might arise out of the contract.
Jurisdiction would attach over such additional contractual claims only
if they were substantially identical to the federal right originally
asserted.
Federal statute/state statute. A group of milk producers contract to
distribute all of their output through a wholesale milk distributor. The
distributor then sells the milk to retailers. The distributor is obligated
to pay the net proceeds of its sales to the producers. A state statute
sets a minimum wholesale price for milk. The distributor, however,
pays a rebate to retailers so that the effective wholesale price is below
the statutory minimum.
The milk producers bring suit alleging a conspiracy in restraint of
trade and a violation of the minimum price statute. The federal claim
arises under the Sherman Act.12 3 A Sherman Act claim is stated because
the producers allege a conspiracy affecting commerce that tends to
restrain trade by encouraging state retailers to purchase less out-of-
state milk than they would normally purchase. 24 Arguably, the reduced
price that the producers receive is sufficient to give them standing to
assert the Sherman Act claim. 12 The state claim arises under the state
minimum price statute. 26 The state claim is made out by showing that
the wholesale price is less than the statutory minimum.127 It is premised
only on the violation of a statutory minimum price, not on a violation
of a state version of the antitrust laws.
Federal jurisdiction should not extend to the state claim. The state
right to a minimum price differs from the federal right to a competi-
tive market. The elements of a Sherman Act violation are irrelevant
to establishing a violation of the state statute. But if the state had
passed an antirebate statute, and if the producers had brought a claim
arising under it, then pendent jurisdiction would attach to this state
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975).
124. Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy Coop. Ass'n, 395 F.2d 420 (3d Cir. 1968).
125. Id. at 424. The Knuth court did not discuss in any detail the difficult issues of
standing under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), which provides for private
treble damage suits. See 395 F.2d at 425. These issues are beyond the scope of this Note.
See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytic Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
L.J. 809 (1977).
126. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 700j-803 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
127. See Colteryahn Sanitary Dairy v. Milk Control Comm'n, 332 Pa. 15, 1 A.2d 775
(198).
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claim. The elements of such a claim might be: (1) secrecy of the
rebate; (2) failure to pay the rebate in like terms to all buyers; and
(3) tendency to destroy competition.128 The state rebate claim would
assert the violation of a right either encompassed within, or sub-
stantially identical to, the Sherman Act claim.
This example may also be used to illustrate the application of this
Note's test to two common situations in which ancillary jurisdiction
is now exercised.12 9 If the producers had secretly been selling part of
their milk output to other wholesalers they would be violating their
output contract. The distributor might state a breach of contract as a
counterclaim. Since the counterclaim seeks to vindicate a contractual
right different from the right to a competitive market, federal juris-
diction would not extend to this counterclaim. 30 If, however, the
distributor sought to implead a group of retailers as third-party de-
fendants because they had engaged in a conspiracy to fix prices by
forcing the payment of the rebates, federal jurisdiction would exist over
this action. Buyers' price fixing is condemned by many state unfair
competition laws.' 3 ' The impleader would be dependent on the right
to a competitive market, the common nucleus of operative law in the
original action.'
32
128. E.g., Baratti v. Koser Gin Co., 206 Ark. 813, 177 S.W.2d 750 (1944).
129. See note 95 supra (discussing present scope of ancillary jurisdiction).
130. Federal Rule 13(a) currently states that counterclaims are compulsory if the coun-
terclaim arises out of the same transaction as the claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). This rule
cannot be construed as permitting a transactional test for ancillary jurisdiction since it
must be read with Rule 82, which states that the Rules are not to be regarded as ex-
panding federal jurisdiction. FED. R. Civ. P. 82. Within the boundaries of federal juris-
diction a transactional test for compulsory counterclaims is appropriate, but a counter-
claim relying on state law should not be compulsory unless the law relied on is sub-
stantially the same as the law relied on in the federal claim.
131. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 8, § 8-10-1 (1975), construed in Dothan Oil Mill Co. v. Espy,
220 Ala. 605, 127 S. 178 (1930); cf. People v. Milk Exch., 145 N.Y. 267, 39 N.E. 1062
(1895) (common law).
132. Other examples might be:
Federal statute/state common law. A law publication is founded in Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts. It calls itself the Yale Law Journal and distributes one issue. The actual Journal
brings suit in federal district court alleging trademark infringement and unfair com-
petition. The federal claim arises under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The elements of trademark infringement are the use in
commerce of a registered trademark, without the owner's consent, such use being likely
to confuse or deceive purchasers of the true origin of the goods. Id. § 1114(1). Actual
intent to infringe need not be shown so long as the device is shown to be calculated
to deceive. Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 613 (7th Cir. 1965).
The state claim is based on the common law. The elements of unfair competition
are the simulation by one person of the tradenames, symbols, or devices employed by a
business rival in order to induce the purchase of goods under a false impression of
their ownership. Brown & Bigelow v. BB Pen Co., 191 F.2d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 1951).
Actual intent need not be shown. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125




Article III provides the means by which rights secured by federal
law are protected in the federal courts. A test for pendent jurisdiction
that allows federal jurisdiction over state claims asserting essentially
the same rights as those protected by federal law comports with the
mandate of Article III. The substantial identity between the state and
federal rights would still tie federal jurisdiction to federal law, and
the congressional conferral of jurisdiction over the federal right would
cover the substantially identical state right. Moreover, such a test
would not constitute an infringement of state sovereignty or an in-
trusion into state law by federal courts, because of the congressional
creation of federal rights essentially the same as state rights.
violation of a right to exclusive use of a tradename has been alleged. The elements
of each are virtually the same.
It may also be said that in recognition of the closeness of such state and federal
claims, Congress conferred jurisdiction over related state claims of unfair competition
in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1970). Under the analysis of Article III in this Note, however, see
pp. 137-38 supra, Congress could not constitutionally confer jurisdiction over state claims
that are merely factually related to federal claims. In addition to a congressional conferral
of jurisdiction, Article III requires the existence of some law upon which the plaintiff
can rely. It is this latter requirement that the test proposed in this Note supplies.
Federal Constitution/state statute. A police officer comes upon a covey of students
who he believes are smoking marijuana. All members of the group flee, except for one
student. The policeman clubs him into insensibility. It is later shown that the students
were not smoking marijuana.
The student brings suit alleging assault and battery and the violation of his Fourteenth
Amendment rights against the city that employs the policeman. The exact locus within
the Constitution of the right to be free from police assault is unclear, but it is beyond
question that a person who is assaulted by a state official can state a claim against the
official under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fitzgerald v. Appolonia, 323 F.. Supp. 1269, 1270
(E.D. Pa. 1971). The two requirements for such a claim are (1) a specific description of the
wrong and (2) the state official's conduct must exceed negligence and constitute inten-
tional misconduct or recklessness. Reed v. Philadelphia Housing Auth., 372 F. Supp.
686, 692 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
The assault and battery claim arises under the common law and a state statute waiving
municipal immunity. E.g., Cook v. Clallam County, 27 Wash. 2d 793, 180 P.2d 573 (1947)
(right to sue is statutory and is subject to legislative limitations); WASH. REv. CODE
ANN. § 4.08.120 (1962). The elements of assault and battery are well established, see W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs §§ 9, 10 (4th ed. 1971), and track with the
Fourteenth Amendment claim. Most importantly, assault and battery cannot be predicated
on negligence; actual intent or recklessness must be shown. Id. § 9 at 35-37, § 10 at 40-41.
Although both claims allege a violation of the same right to be free from bodily harm,
municipalities have been excluded from the class of parties who may be sued for the
deprivation of due process rights. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961). Federal
jurisdiction should not extend over either claim against the municipality. If the student
had also brought state and federal claims against the policeman, however, then pendent
jurisdiction would attach to the state claim against the policeman. State officials are
clearly liable for the deprivation of such rights.
The examples in text and this footnote appear most frequently in the case law. Other
combinations are also possible: federal Constitution/state constitution; federal statute/
state constitution; and treaty/state constitution, statute, or common law.
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A restriction on pendent jurisdiction would also be wise judicial
policy. As Justice Frankfurter noted, the federal courts, like all courts,
exist to secure justice. 133 They must, therefore, be efficiently orga-
nized. But total efficiency would endow the federal courts with gen-
eral jurisdictional powers, and they would displace the state courts as
interpreters of the law governing private activity. Unlike courts of
general jurisdiction, the federal courts also serve a political function-
they help to effect the adjustments upon which life in a federated
nation depends. 34 The jurisdiction of the federal courts must therefore
be determined not only by considerations of efficiency, but also by the
relationship of states to nation. The Gibbs Court disregarded this
political function in the name of judicial efficiency. A more limited
test for pendent jurisdiction would commit the federal courts to their
proper constitutional role.
133. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 500 (1928).
134. Id.
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